

Carbon Sequestration- Policy Design and the Food Carbon Trade off

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Background

- Agricultural Landscapes- potential for mitigating Climate Change



- Reforestation – potentially cost effective sink
- Incentives – to promote revegetation

TRADE OFFS

- Land – fixed input creates competition for production and output tradeoffs
- Influencing factors
 - Spatial variation
 - Policy
 - Landholder motivation
- Interaction between these elements determines land use, production and efficiency outcomes



RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- Investigate the impact of payments for carbon sequestration upon land use choices
 - Native revegetation
 - Dryland agriculture
- Examine the efficiency of market mechanisms in allocating land for agriculture and carbon sequestration
 - Use central planner allocation as baseline
- Compare alternative carbon payment policies
 - Per tonne (expected to be efficient)
 - Per hectare (expected to introduce inefficiency)

RELATED LITERATURE

- Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) models (Parks and Hardie 1995, McCarl and Schneider 2001, De Cara et al. 2005)
- Spatial Targeting- Trade offs in land use choices (Higgins et al. 2008, Polasky et al. 2008, Nelson et al. 2009)
- Alternative payment systems- uniform or discrete (Babcock et al. 1997 , Antle et al. 2003)

DATA

- Lower Murray Landscape futures report (2006)
- Spatially differentiated estimates of:
 - carbon sequestration (3PG)
 - agricultural profits
 - Agricultural production (census data)



MODEL

- landholders choose between traditional agriculture and carbon farming

$$\text{Max: } s (NPV_c) + q (NPV_{ag})$$

$$\text{Subject to: } s+q \leq \text{one}$$

- **NPV_c** – discounted net present value from carbon sequestration
- **NPV_{ag}** – discounted net present value from agricultural production
- **s** and **q** are indicator variables

$$NPV_{ag} = \sum_{t=1}^{64} \frac{agPFE}{(1+r)^t}$$

$$NPV_c = \sum_{t=1}^{64} \frac{\langle cs_t \rangle * p - c_t}{(1+r)^t}$$

- **agPFE** - Profit at Full equity from agriculture
- **r** - land holder discount rate (7%)
- **t** – time period in years
- **cs_t** – carbon sequestered in period t
- **p** - price per CO₂e
- **c_t** costs for carbon sequestration in period t

- Where the payment is per tonne, then carbon sequestered is distinct for each hectare
- Where the payment is per hectare, carbon sequestered is identical for all hectares
- agPFE remains the same under both payment systems

RESULTS- LAND USE CHANGE




\$10/t CO₂e

\$15/t CO₂e

\$20/t CO₂e

\$25/t CO₂e


\$30/t CO₂e



Land Use

- Agriculture
- Carbon sequestration

RESULTS- EFFICIENT PRODUCTION



DISCUSSION

- **Empirical evidence** (Plantinga et al. 2006, 2008)
- **Uncertainty**
 - sequestration rate
 - price levels
- **Sensitivity**
 - set up costs
 - discount rates



DISCUSSION

- Efficiency of production

- per tonne payments – expect efficiency
- per hectare payments- potentially introduces inefficiency

None found..... WHY?

Similar to Babcock et al. 1999

- Agricultural profits- highly variable
- Carbon sequestration – much less variable
- Landholder decision dominated by agricultural profits
- uniform payment – small change in information

- Does the data capture the variation in carbon sequestration adequately??

CONCLUSIONS

- Payment for carbon sequestration may significantly change land use decisions in the Lower Murray
- Landholders make efficient decisions
- Uniform payment system does not create inefficiencies – potential for further investigation

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